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LEGISLATIVE NOTE: DISPOSITION OF THE MENTALLY
ILL OFFENDER IN ILLINOIS-"GUILTY BUT
MENTALLY ILL"
Illinois does not impose criminal responsibility upon defendants who raise
a reasonable doubt as to their sanity at the time of the crime for which
they are charged.' Although the insanity defense has been the subject of
much debate,2 including proposals for its abolition,3 legislative attempts by
states to eliminate the defense have been held unconstitutional.'
Criticism of the insanity defense has been two-fold. First, the defense fails
to accurately separate the sane from the insane offender,5 and second, it
often allows those found not guilty by reason of insanity to be released
1. See People v. Redmond, 59 111. 2d 328, 336-37, 320 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1974) (once defen-
dant raises a reasonable doubt as to his sanity, no criminal responsibility will be imposed unless
state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane). Illinois' insanity test, based
upon the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, was enacted within the Criminal Code
of 1961 and provides:
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such con-
duct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
(b) The terms 'mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1981).
2. The issues of the validity and desirability of the insanity defense have been discussed
at length by numerous authors. See, e.g., H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY
(1972) [hereinafter cited as FINGARETrE]; A. GOLDSTEN, THE INsANIrY DEFENSE (1967) [hereinafter
cited as GOLDSTEIN]; S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME (1967); H. PACKER,
THE LmsTs OF THM CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); T. SzAsz, LAW, LtFRTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963);
B. WoOTroN, CRIME AND THE LAW (1963); BRADY, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-No!, 8
Hous. L. REv. 629 (1971); Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. Juius. 111 (1975);
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963);
Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 719 (1973). For a detailed
discussion of Illinois' approach to the insanity defense, see Thompson, The Future of the In-
sanity Defense In Illinois, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Thompson].
3. Several proposals have been made to eliminate Illinois' insanity defense. See S.B. 61,
81st Gen. Assem., 1980 Sess. 2, ILL. LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG. 18 (1981); deVito, Should the
Insanity Defense Be Eliminated?, 11 ILL. ISSUES 12 (1980); Thompson, supra note 2, at 369-76.
4. See Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (statute prohibiting insanity
as defense to murder violative of due process); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020
(1910) (statute prohibiting insanity as defense to assault violates due process). See also Speidel
v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969) (statute creating a felony is invalid to the extent that it
eliminates conscious purpose to inflict injury or awareness of wrongdoing as requisite elements
of criminal conduct).
5. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 88-92. The author contends that inherent difficulty
in developing a legal standard or rule that can make use of medical concepts to achieve social
objectives and fix responsibility for criminal conduct in a manner acceptable to the public has
resulted in inconsistent decisions and an inability to draw clear distinctions between sane and
insane offenders. Id.
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prematurely from custody, thereby jeopardizing the public's safety.6 Although
a verdict of insanity rarely results in immediate freedom for the defendant,'
it has resulted in cases in which defendants, who were found not guilty by
reason of insanity and later released from custody, went on to commit serious
crimes.' The Illinois legislature has responded to such incidents by enacting
several amendments to the Criminal Code9 designed to protect the public
from dangerous mentally ill offenders and to ensure adequate psychiatric
treatment for these defendants.1'
Illinois' most recent attempt to resolve the problem of the mentally ill
offender is the enactment of the guilty but mentally ill amendments to the
6. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (Task, J., dissenting)
(adoption of A.L.I. test for insanity without a mandatory commitment statute may allow
dangerous persons to go free); State v. White, 60 Wash.2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963) (tests such as the one proposed by the A.L.I. that consider the
defendant's ability to control his behavior in the determination of insanity provide insufficient
protection to society and do not deter crime). For examples of incidents where premature release
of Illinois defendants resulted in injury to the public, see infra note 37.
7. Many states provide for the automatic commitment of insane defendants to mental
hospitals. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(a) (1979); IDAHO CODE § 18-214(l) (Supp. 1980);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (1981). Courts have upheld such statutes against due process
and equal protection attacks. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 402 A.2d 1115 (Del. 1979) (initial commit-
ment and continued confinement of insanity acquittee in state hospital not violative of due
process or equal protection despite less rigid commitment and stricter release procedures as
compared with civil commitment); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980) (statute
providing for commitment of insanity acquittee for evaluation period not violative of due pro-
cess and differences in procedures for civil commitees and insanity acquittees not violative of
equal protection); State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (statute requiring com-
mitment of defendant found not guilty by reason of a mental defect or disease without a hearing
or a determination of fact that he suffered from the disease or defect at the time of commit-
ment not violative of due process or equal protection); People ex rel. Henig v. Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene, 43 N.Y.2d 334, 372 N.E.2d 304, 401 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1977) (mandatory
commitment statute which does not require a prior hearing but which allows the insanity ac-
quittee to seek a hearing at any time to determine the validity of detention not violative of
due process or equal protection). But see Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(criminal commitment must be constitutionally subject to judicial hearing under procedures similar
to civil commitment); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (automatic
commitment for observation is constitutional but due process and equal protection require sanity
hearing upon completion of observation); State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612,
219 N.W.2d 341 (1974) (finding of insanity without full hearing violates due process and equal
protection), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975). For a general discussion concerning automatic
commitment procedures for insane acquittees, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 404 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION];
S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 581 (2d ed. 1973); Note, Commitment Following
An Insanity Acquittal, 94 HAiv. L. REV. 605 (1981).
Although Illinois does not provide for the automatic commitment of defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity, recent amendments to the Correctional Code have virtually en-
sured their continued confinement. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-4 (1981). For a discus-
sion of these amendments, see infra note 44.
8. See infra notes 37 & 39 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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Criminal Code.II These amendments provide an alternative verdict to insanity;
specifically, the verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). The GBMI amend-
ments were enacted as a compromise to the elimination of the insanity
defense.' 2 Through the use of this alternative verdict the Illinois legislature
intended to reduce the number of persons who were erroneously found not
guilty by reason of insanity'3 and to ensure appropriate psychiatric treat-
ment for mentally ill defendants."'
After discussing the problems that prompted enactment of the GBMI
amendments, this Note suggests that legally insane defendants may be de-
prived of their right to an insanity verdict due to the poorly conceptualized
and confusing distinction between mental illness and legal insanity. Although
the legislative objectives behind the GBMI amendments are valid, the GBMI
alternative verdict fails to meet these objectives because of its ill-defined stan-
dards and illusory treatment rights for mentally ill offenders. Finally, after
examining the statute's impact, proposed judicial measures, including a new
jury instruction, are suggested as a means of aiding Illinois courts in fulfill-
ing the statute's legislative purposes and remedying potential constitutional
defects.
11. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, 6-4, 113-4, 113-5, 115-1 to -4, -6, 1005-2-5, -6 (1981).
12. MESSAGE BY GOVERNOR THOMPSON TO THE 82ND GEN. ASSEM., "TECHNICALImES" IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS: CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES THROUGH WHICH THE GUILTY ESCAPE
(Apr. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES]. See S.B. 61, 81st Gen. Assem.,
1980 Sess. 2, ILL. LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG. 18 (1981) (proposing the repeal of the insanity defense,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-4 (1981)).
13. The excessive number of recent insanity verdicts was clearly disturbing to the Bill's spon-
sors. For example, Sen. Geo-Karis, while introducing the GBMI bill in the Senate, noted that,
"many of these [insane defendants] who know what they're doing . . . are not thoroughly
insane but go ahead and perpetrate vicious crimes upon people and get by with it." 82nd Illinois
General Assembly, Senate Debate at 127 (May 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Geo-Karis) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Debate]. Another factor contributing to the enactment of the GBMI verdict
was the media's critical examination of Illinois' release procedures for the insane. See infra
notes 37 & 39 and accompanying text.
14. During debate there were repeated assurances from the Bill's sponsors that GBMI defen-
dants would receive psychiatric treatment as part of their sentence. Sen. Geo-Karis, when
explaining the difference between the guilty verdict and the GBMI verdict stated that "[a guil-
ty but mentally ill defendant can be . . . sentenced exactly as a healthy defendant . . . except
that his sentence must include psychiatric and psychological treatment or counseling." Senate
Debate, supra note 13, at 127 (May 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Geo-Karis). Furthermore,
while explaining the difference between the dispositions of GBMI and insane defendants, Sen.
Sangmeister pointed out that "if you're guilty, but mentally ill . . . you're going to get com-
mitted to the Department of Mental Health and then you're going to come back after you're
cured to serve out the rest of your sentence." Id. at 133 (statement of Sen. Sangmeister). See
also HOUSE REPUBLICAN STAFF ANALYSIS REPORT, 82ND GEN. ASSEM., REPORT ON S.B. 867
2 (1981) (stating that the GBMI bill will create a "mechanism other than treatment/release
for those falling within the consent [sic] of the current insanity defense"). The reason for this
concern about adequate psychiatric treatment was most likely in response to the inadequate
psychiatric care that had been afforded prisoners by Department of Corrections officials in
the past. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
The basic objectives of criminal law-retribution, deterrence, restraint, and
rehabilitation-are not served by convicting and sentencing an insane
offender.S The retributive objective is not furthered because, due to the
diminished mental capacity of the insane, the law does not consider them
blameworthy.1 6 Similarly, imprisonment does not deter the insane from future
antisocial behavior because they are not likely to fear sanctions due to their
incapacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. 7 Furthermore,
society's interest in restraining and rehabilitating the insane is better served
through a medical-custodial disposition 8 of the defendant rather than through
penal confinement.' 9
Through the use of various insanity tests,"0 society seeks to separate from
the criminal justice system persons whose penal confinement would not serve
15. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 36
(1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]. The retribution theory holds that punishment
is imposed on criminals to obtain revenge or to achieve justice by inflicting suffering upon
one who has caused harm. Although generally criticized as morally indefensible, this theory
retains some support as a measure to repress criminal tendencies and to maintain respect for
the law. Under the deterrence theory, suffering is imposed upon criminals in order to deter
the individual offender and the general public from engaging in similar behavior in the future.
The theory underlying restraint is that the isolation of the dangerous offender will serve to
protect society from possible future wrongdoing. The desire of society to reform rather than
punish criminals forms the basis of the rehabilitation theory. Under this approach, punishment
is viewed as treatment designed to modify individual behavior and prevent future crimes. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 2, at 11-14; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at 271-72.
LaFave and Scott add education as a fifth objective of punishment. Under this theory, punish-
ment serves to educate the public with respect to distinctions between proper and improper
conduct in order that they may be better able to conform their conduct with the law. This
is especially important for relatively minor crimes not widely known or understood. LAFAVE
& SCOTT, supra, at 272.
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 12; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 272.
17. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 12-14; LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 271.
18. Medical-custodial disposition refers to the process of involuntarily committing defen-
dants found not guilty by reason of insanity to mental hospitals for treatment after their acquittals.
This is commonly referred to as "criminal commitment." Involuntary hospitalization for other
persons is referred to as "civil commitment." See Note, Commitment Following An Insanity
Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REv. 605 (1981).
19. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 15, at 268.
20. The traditional tests of insanity are the "right-wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests.
The "right-wrong" test originated in 1843 in the famous M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843). Under the M'Naghten test, a defendant is not criminally responsible if, at the time
of the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act, or that the act was wrong. Id. at 720. The "ir-
restistible impulse" test is often used to supplement the "right-wrong" test. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 67. The test requires a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant
had a mental disease which kept him from controlling his conduct. Id. The first use of the
irresistible impulse test in the United States was in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 500
(1844). For further discussions of these insanity tests, see generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2,
at 67-79; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse As A Defense In Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. Rav. 956
(1952); Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test Of Criminal Respon-
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these basic objectives of criminal law.' The difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween persons who should be subject to criminal disposition from those who
should be subject to medical-custodial disposition has been problematic and
generated extensive comment on,2" and revision of, the insanity tests.23 An
equally troubling problem has been the appropriate disposition of insane
defendants." ' The Illinois GBMI amendments are directed primarily at
remedying these two problems; 5 however, before an examination of the
amendments can proceed, an understanding of Illinois' general statutory
scheme for dealing with mentally ill offenders is necessary.
In the past, the Illinois criminal 6 and mental health 7 codes proved to
be effective vehicles for the involuntary confinement and treatment of men-
sibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1227 (1966).
The modern tests are usually referred to as the "product" and "substantial capacity" tests.
Although the "product" test originated in New Hampshire in 1871, see 1. RAY, MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 39 (5th ed. 1871), the test first became popular in Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In Durham, the court articulated the rule that
an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or defect. Id. at 874-75. About a year after the Durham decision, the drafters of the American
Law Institute's (ALI) Model Penal Code produced the "substantial capacity" test that con-
sisted essentially of a revised version of the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to either ap-
preciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Illinois adopted the M'Naghten "right-wrong" test in Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 218, 229 (1859),
and supplemented it with the "irresistible impulse" test in People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32,
48, 126 N.E.2d 620, 626 (1920). This test prevailed until the legislature adopted the "substan-
tial capacity" test in the Criminal Code of 1961 which is still in effect today. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 6-2 (1981).
21. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9-22; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 269.
22. See supra notes 2 & 3.
23. The best example of a court revising its insanity test is found in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court. The court adopted the "product" test in Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), modified it in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (en banc), and replaced it with the ALI "substantial capacity" test in United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
24. See, e.g., People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (automatic com-
mitment following insanity verdict unconstitutional). See also Note, Commitment Following
an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARv. L. REV. 605 (1981) (arguing that more stringent release pro-
cedures for insane defendants than for civilly committed persons are not justified). See general-
ly AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 7; A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); LAFAVE & SCOTT supra note 15, at 317-25.
25. See supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-I to 1008-6-1 (1975). Because this discussion attempts to
isolate procedures that directly led to amendments in the late 1970's, all references will be
to the 1975 Code.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 1-1 to 20-1 (1975) (amended 1979).
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tally ill offenders. For example, mentally ill offenders could be involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital pursuant to the civil commitment statute.2 8
Additionally, an offender scheduled for criminal prosecution could be found
incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily committed. 29 At the trial stage,
a defendant could be found innocent,30 not guilty by reason of insanity,"
or guilty. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity did not provide im-
mediate freedom to the defendant, however, unless the jury determined that
he had "recovered from his insanity" at the time of the trial.3" If the jury
found that the defendant had not recovered, the defendant was committed
to the Department of Mental Health where he could not be released until
he "no longer required mental health services.""
In 1976, a commission authorized by Governor Walker recommended
sweeping changes in the substantive and procedural rights of the mentally
ill in Illinois." ' The Commission also proposed specific revisions concerning
28. Id. § 6-1 to 9-13. Involuntary admission of an individual for up to 60 days could
be obtained by anyone submitting a physician's certificate and asserting the person's "need
for mental treatment." Id. 99 6-1 & 6-6 (for a period of'greater than 60 days a judicial hearing
is required). If the patient did not request a judicial hearing within 60 days, the hospital
superintendent was required to submit to the court a written statement setting forth the reasons
for the continued detention. If the court was "satisfied" with the superintendent's report, it
could order an indefinite commitment. Id. § 6-6. Involuntary commitment could also be ob-
tained through a court order if any citizen filed a petition with the court asserting the person's
need for mental treatment. If, after a hearing, the court determined that the person was in
need of mental treatment, the person could be indefinitely committed to a mental hospital
for care. Id. § 9-6. Finally, emergency admission was authorized up to five days when anyone
alleged that another was in need of mental treatment and immediate hospitalization was necessary
for the protection of that person or others. Id. § 7-1.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 to -2-2 (1975) (repealed 1979). A defendant was
incompetent to stand trial if because of a mental or physical condition he was unable to under-
stand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. Id.
§ 1005-2-1(a). If the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial, the court was required
to transfer him to the Department of Mental Health for a determination of whether he was
subject to involuntary admission. Id. § 1005-2-2(a). If the Department of Mental Health deter-
mined that the defendant did not require hospitalization, he could be released after posting
bond. Id. § 1005-2-2(b).
30. A mentally ill defendant who was found innocent would be released immediately, pro-
vided that the state could not successfully bring civil commitment proceedings pursuant to ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 7-1 (1975) (amended 1979). For a discussion of the civil commitment
statute, see supra note 28.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(b) (1975) (amended 1981).
32. Id. at § 1005-2-4. If the jury determined that the defendant had not recovered from
his insanity, the court was required automatically to commit the defendant to the Department
of Mental Health for up to 12 months. During this period, mental health personnel were re-
quired to determine whether the defendant was subject to indefinite involuntary commitment
under the Mental Health Code. Id. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(b) (1975) (amended
1977 & 1979) (acquittal by reason of insanity required the jury specifically to state whether
the defendant had recovered from his insanity).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 10-1 (1975) (amended 1979).
34. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILLINOIS
[Vol. 31:869
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the disposition of those found incompetent to stand trial35 or not guilty by
reason of insanity."
While the Commission's recommendations were under consideration, two
problems relating to the disposition of mentally ill offenders in Illinois were
emphasized by the media. First, in various instances, defendants who had
been found not guilty by reason of insanity were released prematurely by
the Department of Mental Health and, thereafter, committed another crime.37
Second, defendants whose mental illnesses did not constitute legal insanity
were sentenced to prison without adequate psychiatric care.38 Several of these
media reports characterized the Department of Mental Health as the "weak
link" in a system expected to provide both treatment for, and protection
from, the mentally ill offender.39
In response to the Commission's recommendations and media pressure,
the legislature enacted a new Mental Health Code"0 and substantially amended
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 COMMISSION]. For example, the Commission recommended more
procedural protections for persons subject to involuntary commitment, id. at 13-16, the crea-
tion of the Office of the State Guardian to assume responsibility for patients without legal
guardians, id. at 118-30, the creation of the Legal Advocacy Service to provide legal represen-
tation at every stage of the commitment process, id. at 142-49, and new rights of confidenti-
ality for mental patients, id. at 163-75.
35. See 1976 COMMISSION, supra note 34, at 176-86. Many of the Commission's recommen-
dations were subsequently enacted into law. See infra note 43.
36. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILLINOIS (1977)
143-55 [hereinafter cited as 1977 COMMISSION]. These recommendations were subsequently enacted
into law. See infra note 44. In addition, the Commission recommended judicial review of Depart-
ment of Mental Health decisions to release defendants committed following an insanity verdict.
1977 COMMISSION, supra, at 4. Explaining this provision, the Commission noted:
The crucial question is how is [the determination of when insane defendants are
no longer dangerous] to be made? The Commission considers judicial supervision
of that decision to be essential. The Commission believes that the period of such
judicial supervision should be related to the seriousness of the act involved as ex-
pressed in the sentence authorized by statute.
Id. at 47.
37. See, e.g., Gleick, Getting Away With Murder, NEw TIMS, Aug. 21, 1978, at 21-27
(citing several examples of subsequent killings committed by insane defendants recently released
from mental hospitals); Inmate: How To Beat Murder Rap By Insanity, Waukegan News Sun,
Apr.15, 1978, at 3, col. 2 (defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity for killing a 15
year old and within one year after being released from a mental institution was charged with
a second killing). See also CLosING THE LOOPHOLES, supra note 12, at 7 (citing examples of
Illinois defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity who were released and committed
subsequent killings).
38. See, e.g., Stevens, Patient Abuse Charged At Chester Mental Center, Chi. Sun Times,
Sept. 10, 1980, at 14, col. I (psychologist charged prison officials with abusing inmates due
to inadequate physical and psychiatric care).
39. See, e.g., Fritsch, Plan Off-Grounds Passes For Killer, Chi. Trib., July 8, 1979, at
3, col. I (criticizing Department of Mental Health decision to offer off-grounds privileges to
an insane defendant); Nicodemus & Rooney, Agencies Pass The Buck Over Release Of a Killer,
Chi. Daily News, Oct. 29, 1976, at 4, col. 1 (Department of Mental Health blamed for release
of insane defendant who killed after release).
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 1-100 to 100-120 (1981).
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the existing Criminal Code.4 ' The new Mental Health Code provided many
new substantive rights for the mentally ill,4 2 and the amendments to the
Criminal Code protected the public from premature release of mentally ill
offenders. For example, the amendments virtually guaranteed long-term con-
finement of anyone found incompetent to stand trial 3 and provided more,
stringent release procedures for defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity.4 The most recent amendment to the Criminal Code provides the
trier of fact with an alternative verdict form-guilty but mentally ill. 4 1
THE ILLINOIS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL AMENDMENTS
Following the lead of Michigan" and Indiana,' 7 the Illinois legislature
41. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2-102 (1981) (right to adequate and humane
care in the least restrictive environment); id. § 2-103 (right to correspond by mail, telephone,
or visitation); id. § 2-107 (right to refuse treatment); id. § 2-108 (right to be free of non-
therapeutic restraint); id. § 2-110 (right to refuse electro-convulsive therapy). In regard to civil
commitment procedures, the new Mental Health Code replaces the old "persons requiring mental
treatment" standard with a more contemporary involuntary commitment standard. The Code
now provides for involuntary commitment only if (1) a person is mentally ill and reasonably
expected to inflict physical harm or (2) is unable to provide for his basic needs. Id. §1-119.
The drafters of the new Code, however, intentionally omitted a definition of mental illness.
This omission resulted primarily because the Commission had recommended that mental illness be:
left undefined as in prior codes, largely because any definition which could be made
legally explicit would necessarily be so broad or circular as to preclude accurate
application. By not providing an explicit statutory definition, a common law definition
fashioned by the courts on a case-by-case basis is deemed to be preferable as it
has been in the past.
1976 COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 14. Despite this recommendation, the legislature specifical-
ly attempted to define mental illness in the GBMI amendments. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 6-2(d) (1981). This definition is set out at infra note 50.
43. To establish a protective system for the disposition of defendants found incompetent
to stand trial, the legislature enacted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 104-10 to 104-29 (1981) (repeal-
ing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-2-1 & 1005-2-2 (1979)). This section allows for release
of a non-committable, unfit defendant only if the state is unable to prove the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 104-25. If the state meets its burden of proof, the
defendant may be confined for further treatment up to five years. Id. § 104-25(c) (2).
44. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, § 1005-2-4 (1981). The statute now requires the Department
of Mental Health to classify the insane defendant within 30 days of the verdict as either (1)
civilly committable, (2) not civilly committable but dangerous, (3) not civilly committable, not
dangerous, but in need of out-patient mental care, or (4) not in need of mental health services.
Id. § 1005-2-4(a)(1). The amendment provides statutory authority for courts to commit indefinitely
insane defendants classified within the first two groups and to require out-patient treatment
for defendants classified as being in need of out-patient care. Id. Furthermore, the amendment
requires the criminal court to retain final authority over any decision to release insane defen-
dants from the Department of Mental Health. This judicial authority extends up to the max-
imum period the defendant could have been sentenced if he had been convicted of the offense.
Id. § 1005-2-4(b). Finally, any conflict between the criminal and mental health code standards
are to be resolved in favor of the former. Id. § 1005-2-4(k).
45. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, -4, 113-4, -5, 115-1, -2, -3, -4, -6, 1005-2-5, -6 (1981).
46. See MiCH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (Supp. 1981). The sponsors of Illinois' GBMI
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enacted the GBMI amendments to the Illinois Criminal Code to resolve the
serious problems in the administration of the insanity defense."8 As a result
of this enactment, the Illinois legislature for the first time has distinguished
the concepts of legal insanity, which is defined as the inability to appreciate
the criminality of one's acts,"9 and mental illness, which is now defined as
a "substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior . . . which impaired
that person's judgment . . ."" at the time of the offense. Distinguishing
statute acknowleged the apparent success of Michigan's statute as support for the Illinois bill.
Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 129 (statement of Sen. Sangmeister). The Michigan statute
was the first GBMI statute in the United States and was enacted in response to the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision in People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
In McQuillan, the court held it unconstitutional to commit insane defendants to mental hospitals
absent commitment and release provisions equal to those available to persons civilly commit-
ted. Id. at 547, 221 N.W.2d at 586.
The Michigan GBMI statute has been the subject of considerable comment. See Brown &
Wittner, 1978 Annual Survey Of Michigan Law, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 335 (1979) (includes de-
tailed legislative history of Michigan GBMI statute and possible constitutional challenges); Hoek,
1980 Annual Survey Of Michigan Law, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 657 (1981) (includes analysis of
People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980), the decision upholding the GBMI
statute and an examination of several unsettled constitutional challenges); Robey, Guilty But
Mentally I1, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 374 (1978) (includes statistical analysis
of Michigan's mental health and criminal systems and supports the GBMI statute due to its
probationary provisions); Schwartz, Moving Backward Confidently, 54 MICH. ST. B. J. 847
(1975) (criticizes GBMI statute's failure to mitigate culpability) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz];
Thompson, supra note 2 (criticizes statute because it allows determination of sanity to remain
with jury); Watkins, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise For Pennsylvania,
85 DICK. L. REv. 289 (1981) (supports GBMI statute and recommends its enactment in Penn-
sylvania); Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1979) (recommends that GBMI
and diminished capacity concepts be used conjunctively with insanity defense) [hereinafter cited
as Aggregate Approach]; Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical And Constitutional
Analysis, 53 J. URn. L. 471 (1976) (outlines Michigan commitment statutes and court decisions
that led to GBMI statute concluding that statute is constitutional with proper jury instructions)
[hereinafter cited as Guilty But Mentally Ill]; Note, The Constitutionality Of Michigan's Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188 (1978) (argues Michigan GBMI statute
deprives insane of due process right to an insanity verdict) [hereinafter cited as Constitutionali-
ty] ; Note, Michigan's Revised Mental Health Code, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 620, 645-48 (1976)
(argues purpose of GBMI statute is punitive, not rehabilitative) [hereinafter cited as Mental
Health Code].
47. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-1 to 35-36-2-5 (Burns Supp. 1982). Section 35-36-2-3
incorporates the guilty but mentally ill alternative. Section 35-36-2-5 provides that a GBMI
defendant will be sentenced as if found guilty and, further, that psychiatric treatment shall
be administered.
48. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, 6-4, 113-4, 113-5, 115-1, 115-2, 115-3, 115-4, 115-6,
1005-2-5, 1005-2-6 (1981). See also supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
49. For Illinois' definition of legal insanity, see supra note 1.
50. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981). This section provides:
For purposes of this Section, "mental illness" or "mentally ill" means a substan-
tial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time
of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but
not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior
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these concepts is crucial because the GBMI defendant, unlike the insane defen-
dant, is not relieved of criminal responsibility and may be sentenced to prison
just as if he had been found guilty."
The GBMI amendments to the Illinois Criminal Code provide for the alter-
native verdict of GBMI to be submitted to the jury" whenever a defendant
raises the affirmative defense of insanity. 3 Once the defense is raised, the
burden of proof shifts to the state to establish the defendant's sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt."4 Before the jury can return a GBMI verdict, however,
the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the act with which he has been charged and was not legally in-
sane, but was mentally ill, at the time the act was committed."
In addition to making 4vailable the alternative verdict form of GBMI,
the amendments also permit a defendant to enter a plea of GBMI which
is similar to a guilty plea in that all trial rights are waived.56 The court,
or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Id.
It is interesting to note that Michigan's GBMI statute defines mental illness as "a substantial
disorder of thought or mood which afflicted a person at the time of the offense, and which
significantly impaired such person's judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or abili-
ty to cope with the ordinary demands of life." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 330.1400 (West 1980).
Although the Illinois GBMI bill was introduced with Michigan's definition intact, in order to
gain support of the Illinois Psychiatric Institute, Illinois' definition was amended to adopt the
Institute's definition of mental illness. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 127 (statement
of Sen. Geo-Karis).
51. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(c) (1981) (if defendant was mentally ill but not insane
at the time of the offense he is criminally culpable); id. § 1005-2-6(a) (court may impose sentence
upon GBMI defendant as if he had been found guilty).
52. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-40) (1981). The statute requires the judge to provide
the jurors with the special verdict form of GBMI when warranted by the evidence. Because
the amount of evidence needed to warrant an insanity instruction is at least equal to the amount
needed for a GBMI instruction, logic suggests that whenever the court gives the insanity in-
struction, it must also instruct the jury as to the GBMI verdict. See People v. Rone, 109 Mich.
App. 702, 711, 311 N.W.2d 835, 839 (1981) (GBMI instruction warranted whenever evidence
is sufficient to give insanity instruction); People v. Ritsema, 105 Mich. App. 602, 610, 307
N.W.2d 380, 384 (1981) (error to omit GBMI instruction even if defendant requests its omission).
53. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-4 (1981), specifically includes the defense of insanity as
an affirmative defense. The significance of this classification is that the state is not required
to prove sanity as an element of the crime unless the defendant introduces evidence of insanity
at trial. When the defendant's evidence raises a "reasonable doubt" as to whether he was
sane, the burden of proof shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was sane. See, e.g., People v. Redmond, 59 I11. 2d 328, 337, 320 N.E.2d 321, 326
(1974) (defendant had produced "some evidence" of insanity, but it was insufficient to raise
the "reasonable doubt" required to shift the burden of proof).
The GBMI statute specifically states that mental illness is not an affirmative defense but
rather an alternative verdict. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-4 (1981). Presumably, the burden
of proving mental illness would fall upon the state. See infra note 74.
54. See People v. Redmond, 59 111. 2d 328, 337, 320 N.E. 2d 321, 326 (1974); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 104-11 (1981).
55. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-40) (1981).
56. See id. § 2-115-2(b).
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however, cannot accept the defendant's plea until it has examined a mental
report, held a hearing, and satisfied itself that a factual basis exists for believ-
ing that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense."
If a verdict or plea of GBMI occurs, the amendments also provide greater
sentencing discretion for courts"0 and new treatment opportunities for GBMI
defendants." Following a pre-sentence hearing, the court may sentence the
defendant to probation, periodic imprisonment,' 0 or conditional discharge"
with the requirement that the defendant participate in a court ordered treat-
ment plan." The court's plan must reasonably assure both satisfactory pro-
gress of the defendant's mental treatment and safety for the public.' 3 Failure
to continue in the treatment plan will subject the defendant to revocation
of these discretionary sentences.'
Alternatively, the court may sentence the GBMI defendant as if he had
been found guilty of the offense.' 5 If sentenced to prison, however, the
amendments require prison officials to review the defendant's need for treat-
ment and to provide either the mental treatment they deem "necessary" or
to transfer him to the Department of Mental Health. 66 Assuming a transfer
of the defendant occurs, if treatment at the Department of Mental Health
57. See id. Section 2-115-2(b) provides:
(b) Before or during trial a plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by
the court when:
(1) the defendant has undergone an examination by a clinical psychologist or
psychiatrist and has waived his right to trial; and
(2) the judge has examined the psychiatric or psychological report or reports; and
(3) the judge has held a hearing, at which either party may present evidence on
the issue of the defendant's mental health and, at the conclusion of such hearing,
is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the
time of the offense to which the plea is entered.
58. Compare ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(e) (1981) (all GBMI defendants eligible
for probation regardless of the offense committed) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1
(1981) (mandatory statutory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants found guilty
of particular felonies). See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
59. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (1981) (prison officials shall review and
treat GBMI defendant's mental illnesses) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(e)(2) (1981)
(court shall reasonably assure GBMI defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment) with ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-5(a) (1981) (prison officials required to provide psychiatric treat-
ment only if non-GBMI prisoner is subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Health
Code). See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
60. Periodic imprisonment refers to temporary confinement of an individual at regular in-
tervals, for example, nights and weekends. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-7-1 to -7-8 (1981).
61. Conditional discharge is a sentence of revocable release without probationary supervi-
sion but subject to conditions the court may impose. See id. § 1005-4.
62. Id. § 1005-2-6(e)(1).
63. Id. § 1005-2-6(e)(2). This section provides for family supervision, community adjust-
ment programs, outpatient care, and periodic checks with legal authorities as some of the con-
ditions available to ensure the defendant's care and the public's safety while on probation.
64. Id. § 1005-2-6(e)(3).
65. See id. § 1005-2-6(a).
66. Id. § 1005-2-6(c).
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is successful, the defendant must be returned to prison to serve the remainder
of his sentence.67 On the other hand, if treatment is unsuccessful the defen-
dant may be committed to the Department of Mental Health providing he
meets the requirements of involuntary commitment under the Mental Health
Code. 61
CRITICISM
Despite the Illinois legislature's commendable attempt to address the prob-
lems inherent in dealing with the mentally ill offender, the GBMI amend-
ments fail to adequately alleviate these problems. First, the GBMI verdict
may effectively deprive some legally insane defendants of their statutory, 9
if not constitutional,"0 right to an insanity verdict. This potential for the
deprivation of the insanity verdict results from the poorly conceptualized
distinction between mental illness and legal insanity which may yield jury
confusion and promote compromise verdicts."
To illustrate, an erroneous finding of GBMI is likely to result because
the jury often will be unable to distinguish the conceptually overlapping defini-
67. Id. § 1005-2-6(d)(1).
68. See id. § 1005-2-6(d)(2).
69. See id. § 6-2. A defendant has a statutory right to an insanity verdict if he lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions or is unable to conform his
conduct to the law. Id.
70. Although the Supreme Court has never clearly stated that an insanity defense is con-
stitutionally required, all legislative attempts to eliminate the defense have been ruled unconstitu-
tional. See supra note 4. For a detailed argument supporting the proposition that insane defen-
dants have a due process right to an insanity verdict, see Constitutionality, supra note 46,
at 191-95.
71. In order to successfully challenge a conviction on this basis, a defendant would be re-
quired to show that the GBMI verdict form caused the jury to erroneously find him GBMI
instead of not guilty by reason of insanity. Alternatively, GBMI defendants could contend that
the statute deprives them of their right to have the jury accurately instructed on the applicable
law of the case because of the confusion likely to be caused by the GBMI alternative verdict
form. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "[a] defendant is entitled to have the jury
so instructed that it may not become confused as to what constitutes the issue before it, and
were it to appear that such confusion might reasonably arise, the giving of such an instruction
would constitute error." People v. Schyman, 374 111. 292, 297, 29 N.E.2d 270, 273 (1940).
Accord United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1975) (confusion concerning exact
definition of "wrongfulness" contained within insanity test constituted reversible error); Peo-
ple v. Foster, 23 111. App. 3d 559, 319 N.E.2d 522 (1974) (seemingly contradictory instruction
concerning the criminal responsibility of intoxicated defendants so confused and misled the
jury as to constitute reversible error). But cf. People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 292 N.W.2d
523 (1980) (Michigan's definition of mental illness sufficiently distinguishes between concepts
of insanity and mental illness). Despite the holding in Thomas, the Michigan definition of mental
illness has been criticized due to its potential for confusing jurors. See Hoek, supra note 46,
at 675-76; Schwartz, supra note 46, at 849; Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 46, at 488-89;
Constitutionality, supra note 46, at 195-98. But see Aggregate Approach, supra note 48, at
374-76 (distinctions between insanity and mental illness are no more vague than the reasonable
man standard of tort law).
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tions of legal insanity and mental illness. 2 In the insanity instruction, jurors
are told that they must return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant suffered from
a mental disease or mental defect that resulted in his inability to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the law's requirements. 3
In the GBMI instruction, however, jurors are told that they must return
a verdict of GBMI if they find beyond a reasonable doubt 4 that the defen-
dant committed the offense while suffering from a "substantial disorder of
thought, mood, or behavior . . ."'I that impaired his judgment. It is dif-
ficult, at best, for even a sophisticated juror to discern the fine distinction
between these two definitions."
In addition to being confused, jurors are likely to compromise and find
an insane defendant GBMI in an effort to ensure both treatment for the
72. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1981) (insanity defined as suffering from a
mental disease and lacking substantial capacity to appreciate criminality of the act) with ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981) (mental illness defined as suffering from a "substantial
disorder" that impairs judgment).
73. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 24-25:01 (1981).
74. Although GBMI excludes mental illness as an affirmative defense, it does require the
jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was mentally ill before
returning a verdict of GBMI. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-40) (1981). Presumably, the burden
of proof would be upon the state to prove mental illness. Thus, although GBMI is not an
affirmative defense, with respect to the placement of the burden of proof, it is treated as if
it were. One defense lawyer remarked, however, that because proving mental illness is a prere-
quisite to a successful insanity defense, the GBMI amendments now require the defendant to
aid the state by proving one element of the crime, namely, mental illness. Telephone interview
with Lorna E. Propes, Chicago Attorney (Mar. 5, 1982).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981). Essentially, before returning a verdict of GBMI,
the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane and men-
tally ill at the time of the offense.
76. Not only did the legislature add more confusion to an already extremely perplexing
decision for jurors, but it also ignored better alternatives that would have furthered the legislature's
purpose of reducing the number of erroneous insanity verdicts. Under present law, the burden
of proof is placed upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sane at the time of the offense. See supra note 1. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury
must find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if it has reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's sanity. See ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIoNS 24-25:01 (1981). Because of the high
degree of proof required to find a mentally ill defendant legally sane, many defendants, may
erroneously be found not guilty by reason of insanity merely because the state was unable
to meet its burden of proof. Instead of creating an alternative verdict of GBMI, the legislature
could simply have followed other states and the District of Columbia and required that the
defendant prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Ruffin v. State,
50 Del. 83, 123 A.2d 461 (1956). See also Note, Constitutional Limitations On Allocating the
Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REV. 499, 503-04
(1976) (listing 22 states that place the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence upon the defendant). Shifting the burden of proving insanity to the defendant would
reduce the number of erroneous insanity verdicts without requiring the jury to make the near
impossible distinction between definitions of legal insanity and mental illness.
1982]
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defendant and protection for society. This compromise may occur for several
reasons. First, when presented with multiple verdicts, jurors frequently at-
tempt to find "middle ground" rather than fully debate the defendant's guilt
or innocence." Second, studies suggest that jurors commonly focus on the
sanction which will be imposed upon a defendant as a result of a particular
verdict.7" In Illinois, jurors may be reluctant to find a defendant insane
because they are not informed as to the defendant's disposition after a ver-
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity, thus, their preconceived ideas con-
cerning Illinois' release procedures for the insane may prejudice their ultimate
finding.79 This reluctance, coupled with the natural desire to ensure psychiatric
treatment for mentally ill defendants, may encourage the jury to find a defen-
dant GBMI despite having a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity.
In addition to depriving some legally insane defendants of an insanity ver-
dict, the GBMI statute may deprive a defendant of a due process right to
a hearing because it permits a jury to infer that the defendant is mentally
ill at the time of sentencing based upon a finding that the defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the offense.80 As a result, a defendant is labeled
mentally ill and may be subjected to intrusive psychiatric treatment based
solely upon the jury's finding that mental illness was present at the time
of the offense.8 Many courts, when faced with committing defendants found
not guilty by reason of insanity, have held that this presumption of con-
tinued mental illness between the time of the offense and trial is irrational
77. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970) (charge of a greater offense may induce
verdict of lesser offense without full debate as to the defendant's innocence); United States
v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 1972) (if jury is unsure on issue of guilt, they may
convict of lesser offense instead of fully debating defendant's innocence); R. Simon, The Jury
and the Defense of Insanity 178 (1967) (based on concern for the accused, juries prefer middle
ground between acquittal and guilty verdict). One commentator has suggested that the GBMI
verdict is exactly the type of "middle ground" jurors prefer. See Constitutionality, supra note
46, at 196-98.
78. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 178 (1967).
79. The Illinois Supreme Court has declared that the jury should not be instructed as to
the disposition of the defendant upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. People
v. Moor, 355 111. 393, 400, 189 N.E.2d 318, 321 (1934). Accordingly, it is not surprising that
jurors are naturally reluctant to return a verdict of insanity given the manner in which the
media has reported on insane defendants who were prematurely released. See supra notes 37 & 39.
80. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981) (mental illness is to be determined at the
time of the commission of the offense).
81. Many courts hold that civil commitment procedures that subject persons to involuntary
psychiatric treatment invoke a fundamental liberty interest to be balanced against the state's
interest. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (commitment to mental hospital is cur-
tailment of liberty requiring due process protection); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (persons subject to civil commitment must be afforded least restrictive treatment
alternative); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (involuntarily confined men-
tal patients have due process right to minimally adequate treatment). See generally R. SCHWITZ-
GEBEL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE (1980) (author reviews various state statutes and
court decisions articulating a patient's right to refuse treatment); Rhoden, The Right To Refuse
Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (1980) (author argues that "competent"
mental patients should enjoy an absolute right to refuse psychotropic medication); Zlotnick,
First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients
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and unwarranted and, thus, violative of an insane defendant's due process
rights.82 An equally compelling argument can be made that a GBMI defen-
dant, despite his conviction, enjoys a similar due process right to a hearing
to determine his present mental condition and his need for treatment at the
time of sentencing.
Further, the Supreme Court recently held that prisoners have a due pro-
cess liberty interest in not being erroneously labeled mentally ill and involun-
tarily subjected to various intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy without the
due process protection of a hearing to determine their present need for mental
treatment. 3 Under this analysis, a defendant found GBMI could contend
that the statute's use of a presumption of continued mental illness sub-
jects him to the possibility of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy without
the due process protection of a hearing to determine his present need for
such treatment.
Ironically, it is unlikely that a GBMI defendant sentenced to prison will
be in a position to complain of unwarranted psychiatric treatment because
the GBMI amendments clearly fall short of the goal of ensuring adequate
psychiatric care for defendants after conviction. Once a defendant is transfer-
red to the Department of Corrections, his opportunities for psychiatric care
are solely within the discretion of prison officials as they "determine
necessary." 8 The failure to ensure adequate psychiatric care is primarily due
to the excessive discretion afforded prison officials who have historically been
unable to provide adequate psychiatric care for mentally ill prisoners." In-
To Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375 (1981) (author concludes that although patients
should not have an absolute right to refuse treatment, the state should be compelled to render
treatment in the least restrictive setting).
82. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (commitment of defendants
found not guilty by reason of insanity permissible only for period required to determine their
present mental condition); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 537, 221 N.W.2d 569, 577
(1974) (striking Michigan's automatic commitment statute for insane defendants as violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses); State ex. rel Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis.
2d 612, 622-23, 219 N.W.2d 341, 346-47 (1974) (automatic commitment of persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity violates equal protection clause), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975).
But see In re Lewis, 403 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Del. 1979) (equal protection does not require same
commitment procedures for insane defendants and civil commitees).
Some states, by statute, require the court specifically to find that the defendant is mentally
ill at the time of sentencing before commitment. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West
Supp. 1980); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.329 (1979); VA. CODE § 19.2-181(1) (Supp. 1980).
83. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, the Court held that prisoners have a
due process right to a hearing to determine their present need for mental treatment before
prison officials can involuntarily transfer them to mental hospitals. Although acknowledging
that prisoners enjoy considerably less rights than persons subject to civil commitment, the Court
reasoned that the "stigmatizing consequences" of a transfer to a mental hospital for involun-
tary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior
modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty
that require procedural protections. Id. at 486.
84. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (1981).
85. It is indeed ironic that the legislature gave the Department of Corrections the additional
responsibility of treating mentally ill offenders when Illinois prisons are presently so overpopulated
that inmates are prematurely released to attempt to maintain minimum custodial standards re-
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deed, the dubious treatment opportunities for GBMI defendants sentenced
to prison greatly undermine the legislature's objectives" and the jury's in-
tentions in finding a defendant GBMI. Because of the tremendous discre-
tion given to prison officials, the GBMI defendant has little assurance that
he will be provided meaningful psychiatric care within the Department of
Corrections.
In addition to not receiving adequate psychiatric care in prison, the GBMI
defendant who is transferred to the Department of Mental Health for treat-
ment is provided little incentive for improvement. This is due to the fact
that a GBMI defendant, unlike a defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity, is immediately returned to prison after he recovers from his mental
illness." The release procedures for insane defendants, however, provide for
the conditional release of these defendants from the Department of Mental
Health when the court determines that they are no longer dangerous."
Although these conditional release procedures are new and have not yet
been tested adequately, they appear to protect society from dangerously in-
sane defendants without requiring a defendant to serve an extended prison
term after successful mental treatment. Moreover, these release procedures
further the legislature's objective of providing incentive for the mentally ill
offender to cooperate with mental health personnel during treatment. Thus,
the Illinois legislature, without acknowledging the recently amended release
procedures for insane defendants,"' may have needlessly provided for the
continued institutionalization of non-dangerous, mentally ill offenders who
will have little incentive to cooperate with treatment because of the inability
to obtain an early release.9
quired by the Constitution. See Chi. Sun Times, Mar. 25, 1981, at 14, col. 1 (early release
of prisoners).
Although the GBMI amendments require the Department of Corrections to "cause periodic
inquiry and examination . . . concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of
the defendant's mental illness," the statute allows the Department of Corrections to provide
such treatment "as it determines necessary." Id. Furthermore, it is wholly within prison of-
ficial's discretion to transfer the defendant to the Department of Mental Health for treatment.
Id. § 1005-2-6(c) (1981).
86. See supra note 14.
87. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-2-6(d)(1) (1981) (GBMI defendant returned
to prison after successful treatment) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-4 (1981) (insane
defendant eligible for conditional release when court determines defendant is neither mentally
ill nor dangerous).
88. Conditional release is a process by which GBMI defendants may be released from custody
subject to such restrictions as the court shall impose to reasonably insure defendants' progress
and society's safety. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-4 (1981). See id. See also supra note
44 (discussing release procedures and standards).
89. Although both the Governor's Message and Senate debates cite several examples of
insane defendants prematurely released under the old commitment standard, neither the Gover-
nor nor the Senate mentioned the recently amended insanity release procedures in relation to
the GBMI enactment. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 93-160; CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES
supra note 12.
90. In addition to the possible excessive incarceration of non-dangerous offenders, the GBMI
amendments fail to provide for confinement of these defendants beyond their prison terms
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IMPACT
The GBMI amendments will likely decrease the percentage of insanity ver-
dicts in Illinois. Furthermore, it will create new pre-trial procedures, eviden-
tiary issues, and sentencing options for criminal courts. Finally, it provides
statutory authority for prison officials to treat mentally ill prisoners.
Fewer Insanity Verdicts
The percentage of insanity verdicts in Illinois is likely to decrease as a
direct result of the GBMI amendments. The impact resulting from the enact-
ment of a similar GBMI verdict alternative in Michigan supports this con-
clusion. After Michigan enacted its GBMI statute, the percentage of insanity
verdicts decreased from 8.4 percent in 1976 to 6.1 percent in 1982,"' not-
if they remain dangerous. If the GBMI defendant's sentence expires while he is being treated
for his illness, he must be released unless his mental illness is sufficient to require involuntary
commitment under the Mental Health Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-2-6(d)(1) (1981).
The Mental Health Code requires a finding of both mental illness and dangerousness before
a person may be involuntarily committed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-119 (1981). See
supra note 44. Commitment procedures of this nature previously have failed to ensure that
defendants remain confined as long as they are dangerous. See supra notes 37 & 39.
Conversely, if the defendant is found insane, the amended release procedures provide authority
for courts to ensure the defendant's continued confinement as long as he is reasonably likely
to inflict physical harm upon himself or others. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-4 (1981).
Thus, although the legislature was responding to the premature release of insane defendants
when it enacted the GBMI statute, it may have hampered courts in their efforts to protect
society from dangerous offenders.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the more stringent
release procedures for insane defendants than for persons civilly committed, it is interesting
to note that the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a similar distinction as violative of
an insane defendant's equal protection rights. See People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221
N.W.2d 569 (1974). It was this McQuillan decision, as well as the subsequent release of hun-
dreds of defendants from mental hospitals, that served as the impetus behind the enactment
of Michigan's GBMI statute. See Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 46, at 483; Constitu-
tionality, supra note 46, at 188.
91. For the years 1976-1982 the Michigan Center For Forensic Psychiatry (CFP) reports:
Number of Number of
defendants defendants
pleading not Number of Percentage of found GBMI
guilty by reason defendants defendants & sentenced to
Year of insanity found insane found insane prison
1976 378 32 8.4%
1977 561 47 8.307o
1978 746 51 6.8% 114*
1979 948 68 7.1%
1980 1122 64 5.707o 29
1981 1082 54 5.0% 37
1982 1060 65 6.1076 33
*from Aug. 5, 1975 to Dec. 31, 1979.
Telephone interview with Lynn Blunt, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist at the Michigan Center For
Forensic Psychiatry (Jan. 24, 1983). See Robey, supra note 46, at 380 (rate of insanity acquit-
tals decreased between August 5, 1975 and June 1, 1978 as a result of the GBMI statute).
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withstanding the fact that a greater number of defendants raised the insani-
ty defense.9" Many commentators attribute this decrease in the percentage
of insanity verdicts to the confusion caused by the poorly conceptualized
distinction between mental illness and legal insanity.93 Although the Illinois
legislature drafted a new definition of mental illness,9" it failed to clarify
the confusing distinction between mental illness and legal insanity and, in
fact, may have compounded the problem." Therefore, a reasonable inference
can be made that a decrease in the percentage of insanity verdicts will result
in Illinios due to this confusing distinction.
The potential decrease in the percentage of insanity verdicts that may result
from jury confusion and compromise is illustrated by examining Illinois' first
GBMI verdict in People V. DeWit"' In DeWit, the defendant was charged
with murder and raised the affirmative defense of insanity. Judge Cieslik
read the standard insanity instruction,97 and further informed the jury that,
"[a] person is guilty but mentally ill if at the time of the commission of
an offense he was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness."'"
This was followed by a verbatim reading of the statutory definition of men-
tal illness. 9
The jury's confusion, when presented with the seemingly contradictory
GBMI and insanity definitions, was evident from the fact that the jury
foreman returned a note to Judge Cieslik requesting assurance that finding
92. The increase in insanity pleas was nearly threefold between 1976 and 1982. Telephone
interview with Lynn Blunt, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist at the Michigan Center For Forensic
Psychiatry (Jan. 24, 1983).
93. Before these figures were available, commentators predicted that the confusing defini-
tions would result in fewer insanity verdicts. See Hoek, supra note 46, at 675; Schwartz, supra
note 46, at 848-49; Aggregate Approach, supra note 46, at 374-76; Guilty But Mentally IIl,
supra note 46, at 492-93; Constitutionality, supra note 46, at 199.
94. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981).
95. One Illinois Senator stated that Illinois' new definition of mental illness is so broad
and confusing that it would likely defeat the purpose of the bill. Senate Debate, supra note
13, at 128 (statement of Sen. Keats).
96. People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook Co., I11. Oct. 1, 1981) (Cieslik,
J.).
97. Judge Cieslik read People's Instruction No. 12 which is contained in ILL. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 24-25.01 (1981). The instruction provides:
A person is insane and not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time
of the conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
Abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal, or otherwise anti-social con-
duct, is not mental disease or mental defect.
People's Instruction No. 12, People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook Co.,
111. Oct. 1, 1981).
98. People's Instruction No. 13, People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook
Co., Ill. Oct. 1, 1981).
99. People's Instruction No. 14, People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook
Co., II1. Oct. 1, 1981). For the definition of mental illness, see supra note 50.
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the defendant mentally ill would not contradict finding him sane beyond
a reasonable doubt.' °° After receiving this assurance,' 01 the jury returned
a verdict of GBMI.'0 2 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued
that the GBMI amendments are unconstitutional because they fail to pro-
vide adequate standards for the jury accurately to distinguish between the
concepts of mental illness and legal insanity.' 3 The motion was denied and
the case presently is being appealed.'0 ' Regardless of how DeWit is resolved
on appeal, the fact remains that the statutory distinction between insanity
and mental illness will continue to promote jury confusion and compromise.
Judicial Procedures
In addition to reducing the percentage of insanity verdicts, the statutory
enactment of GBMI creates the need for pre-trial procedures designed to
guard against erroneous findings of mental illness and guilt. For example,
if the defendant pleads GBMI the court will be required to review the defen-
dant's psychiatric report and determine whether there is a factual basis for
the defendant's assertion of mental illness at the time of the offense.", This
measure will prevent mentally healthy defendants from pleading GBMI in
an effort to gain a favorable disposition. It is likely that the court will also
be required to determine whether there is a factual basis to support the defen-
dant's admission of guilt for the offense.' 6 Together, these procedures will
100. The jury foreman, after repeating the apparently contradictory instructions, stated:
[t]he jury will render a unanimous decision in favor of the second verdict [GBMI]
if you can confirm our understanding that this verdict does not contradict the three
propositions in ()-[finding the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt] but
essentially adds the qualification of mental illness.
Record at 1657-58, People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook Co., Ill. Oct.
1, 1981).
i01. Telephone interview with Lorna E. Propes, DeWit's Defense Counsel (March 5, 1982).
102. DeWit was sentenced to 22 years imprisonment. People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal
Court, Cook Co., Ill. Oct. 1, 1981).
103. Defendant's Motion For New Trial at 3, People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal
Court, Cook Co., Ill. Oct. 1, 1981). The defendant also submitted a memorandum arguing
against the GBMI instruction because the offense occurred before the GBMI statute was enacted.
The defendant argued, in part, that the GBMI verdict would "fundamentally and irrevocably
work to defendant's disadvantage" because a finding of mental illness acts as an additional
punishment placed upon the defendant with no corresponding mitigation in sentence. Defen-
dant's Memorandum of Law In Opposition To The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict at 3-6,
People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook Co., Il1. Oct. 1, 1981).
104. People v. DeWit, No. 80 C 6347 (Criminal Court, Cook Co., Ill. Oct. 1, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 81-3019 (1st Dist. Ct. App., Dec. 7, 1981).
105. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-2(b) (1981). A plea of guilty but mentally ill may
be accepted if the defendant has undergone a mental examination and waived his trial right,
the judge has reviewed the psychiatric report, and the judge has held a hearing which establishes
that defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime. Id.
106. See id. § 115-2(a)(2). Instead of merely hearing evidence of the charge, the court must
now "determine the factual basis for the plea [of guilty]." Id. Although this section was amended
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aid in avoiding erroneous findings of guilt and mental illness, thus guarding
against the possibility that the state's mental health facilities will be used
to institutionalize psychologically healthy defendants and the state's correc-
tional facilities used to institutionalize innocent defendants.
If the defendant chooses not to plead GBMI but instead pleads innocent
and asserts the defense of insanity, to ensure proper jury instruction the
court will have to distinguish carefully between evidence probative of in-
sanity and evidence probative of mental illness. In Illinois, evidence of per-
sonality disorders, idiosyncratic behavior, and disturbed thinking is insuffi-
cient to justify a reasonable doubt of sanity.'"" The rationale behind this
is that although the evidence may show that the defendant was mentally
ill, it is insufficient to justify a reasonable doubt as to whether the defen-
dant was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of
the offense."' The GBMI amendments, however, broadly define mental ill-
ness to include any "thoughts, moods, or behaviors" that impaired the defen-
dant's judgment.' °9 Because the amount of evidence required to prove im-
paired judgment is less than the amount required to prove insanity, this may
result in a situation in which the evidence is sufficient to warrant a GBMI
instruction but insufficient to warrant an insanity instruction."l 0
Sentencing Options
The most significant impact of the GBMI amendments undoubtedly will
be in the area of sentencing. Prior to the enactment of the GBMI verdict
alternative, Illinois' determinate sentencing procedures required trial courts
to comply with statutory limits in sentencing defendants who pled or were
found guilty of particular felonies."' With the enactment of GBMI, the courts
to include only those defendants who plead guilty, it will most likely be interpreted to include
the GBMI defendant who pleads guilty. In addition, the GBMI plea will likely be interpreted
to include other statutory and constitutional guarantees that accompany guilty pleas such as
the requirement that a defendant must knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. People
v. Weakley, 45 Ill. 2d 549,-259 N.E.2d 802 (1970). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 402
(1981) (Supreme Court Rule 402 requires defendant to be admonished personally as to the
nature and possible sentence for the charge, his right to plead not guilty, and the fact that
his plea of guilty waives his right to trial).
In practice, however, this will not result in significant procedural changes because in the
past Illinois courts have required trial courts to determine whether there was a factual basis
for the defendant's guilty plea before it could accept the plea. See, e.g., People v. Martin,
58 Ill. App. 3d 633, 374 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1978) (purpose for setting forth a factual basis
for guilty plea is to protect defendant from pleading guilty to a charge he did not commit).
107. See People v. Lono, 11 Ill. App. 3d 443, 449, 297 N.E.2d 349, 354 (1st Dist. 1973)
(citing numerous authorities).
108. Id.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(d) (1981).
110. In Michigan, however, the two instructions are given together. See 1 MICH. CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONs 7:8:02A (Supp. 1979).
Ill. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2) (1981). This section sets out the minimum
sentences that must be imposed for each class of crimes. Under this schedule, the imposition
of probation is prohibited for the convictions of murder, attempted murder, Class X felonies
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have been afforded greater sentencing discretion to fulfill their statutory du-
ty of ensuring the appropriate disposition of GBMI defendants."' After a
mandatory pre-sentence hearing," 3 the court has two alternatives: (1) sentence
the defendant as if he had been found guilty,'" or (2) sentence the defen-
dant to probation, periodic imprisonment, or conditional discharge with the
requirement that he participate in a treatment plan prescribed by the court."
These sentencing alternatives are notable exceptions to Illinois' determinate
sentencing law which prohibits probation for particular crimes.",
If the probation option is utilized, the statute gives courts discretion to
develop and implement treatment plans that "reasonably assure the defen-
dant's satisfactory progress" toward mental health." 7 This option is likely
to be chosen by trial judges who are cognizant of the limited treatment op-
portunities facing GBMI defendants in prison." 8 With the probation option,
however, one issue certain to arise is the extent to which trial courts may
compromise the public's interest in safety by sentencing the GBMI defen-
dant to probationary treatment instead of prison.
Finally, although the statute increases the court's sentencing options in
many areas, a finding of GBMI necessarily precludes the jury from issuing
the death sentence." 9 Under current law, the existence of mental illness at
the time of the crime is a mitigating factor that the jury must balance against
aggravating factors in determining whether a defendant should be sentenced
to death.'20 In view of the statutory treatment rights that underlie a GBMI
(defined at id. § 1005-5-3(c)(6)), violations of the Controlled Substances Act (id. ch. 56 1/2,
§§ 1402 or 1407), the Cannabis Control Act (id. ch. 56 1/2, § 709), or repeated class two
felonies within 10 years of a class one felony. Probation is also prohibited if the court finds
the defendant to be a "habitual criminal" pursuant to ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-1 (1981).
112. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1981).
113. IlL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1981) provides that "a defendant shall not be sentenced
for a felony before a written pre-sentence report of investigation is presented to and considered
by the court." Id.
114. Id. § 1005-2-6(a).
115. Id. § 1005-2-6(e).
116. The legislative intent to create these exceptions is even more apparent when Illinois'
discretionary probation is compared with Michigan's mandatory requirement that GBMI defen-
dants be sentenced as if they had been found guilty of the offense. Compare ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(a) (1981) (the court may impose any sentence upon the defendant which
could have been imposed if the defendant had been found guilty) with MICH. CoUP. LAWS
ANN. § 768.36(3) (West 1981) (the court must impose any sentence that could have been impos-
ed had the GBMI defendant been found guilty).
117. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(e)(2) (1981). Although not an exclusive list, the statute
provides authority for family supervison, police supervison, community adjustment programs,
and outpatient care as examples of appropriate treatment plans. Id.
118. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
119. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1981). This section allows the jury to consider
a sentence of death if (1) the victim was a peace officer, fireman, correctional employee, or
witness, (2) if the defendant had been convicted of two previous murders, or (3) if the defen-
dant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, while hijacking an airplane, or in the course
of another felony. Id.
120. See id. § 9-1(c)(2). After finding at least one aggravating factor, the jury must consider
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verdict, to order death as the GBMI defendant's treatment would not only
be contrary to the legislature's objectives,' 21 but also would be morally
reprehensible.
A final consequence of the Illinois GBMI amendments is that when a defen-
dant is sentenced to prison, the Department of Corrections has greater
statutory authority to provide psychiatric treatment than under prior law.
Previously, prison officials were required to give psychiatric care only to
prisoners who met the requirements of involuntary admission under the Men-
tal Health Code.' 2 The GBMI amendments, however, provide for psychiatric
treatment to GBMI defendants regardless of whether they are sufficiently
mentally ill to meet the standard of involuntary admission under the Mental
Health Code.'2 3 Thus, although a defendant's treatment opportunities are
largely within the suspect discretion of prison officials,'2 the GBMI amend-
ments do grant authority to provide psychiatric treatment for a class of men-
tally ill prisoners previously neglected by Illinios law.
SUGGESTED APPROACH
In order to effectuate the goals of the GBMI amendments, the Illinois
courts must provide jurors with a clear distinction between a GBMI verdict
and the verdict of insanity, thereby alleviating jury confusion and the tendency
toward compromise verdicts that may potentially deprive legally insane defen-
dants of an insanity verdict. Additionally, to avoid a potential violation of
the defendant's due process rights, a hearing should be held to determine
the defendant's mental condition at the time of sentencing rather than relying
mitigating factors to determine whether the death sentence is appropriate. One mitigating fac-
tor is if "the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution."
Id. If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
the sentence of death, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Id. § (g).
121. See supra note 14. Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, however, believes different-
ly. After signing the GBMI Bill, Thompson suggested that a GBMI defendant could be sentenced
to death as long as the defendant is "mentally right when you electrocute him." J. Shedd
& K. Uhlmann, Thompson Signs 'Guilty But Mentally Ill' Bill, Chi. L. Bull., Sept. 17, 1981,
at I, col. I.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-5 (1981) requires the Department of Corrections to
"ascertain whether any person committed to it may be subject to involuntary admission
. . . or . . . judicial admission. . . ." Id. The Mental Health Code defines persons subject
to involuntary admission as (1) mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon himself or another in the near future, or (2) unable to provide for their basic
needs. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-119 (1981). The Mental Health Code further defines
persons subject to judicial admission as (1) mentally retarded, and (2) reasonably expected to
inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. Id. § 4-500.
123. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b). Furthermore, the GBMI amendments require
the Department of Corrections to "cause periodic inquiry and examination . . . concerning
the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness." Id.
124. See id. § 1005-2-6(b), (c) (defendant will be provided such treatment and counselling
as department deems necessary).
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solely on a finding of mental illness at the time of the offense.'25 Finally,
Illinois courts should utilize the GBMI treatment alternatives to their fullest
extent and, if necessary, order state officials to provide adequate psychiatric
treatment for GBMI defendants. Together, these safeguards should sustain
the GBMI amendments against due process challenges and help fulfill the
legislature's dual objectives of reducing erroneous insanity verdicts and
ensuring adequate care for mentally ill offenders.
Because the GBMI instruction is warranted whenever the insanity instruc-
tion is given,' 26 both instructions should be incorporated into a new insanity
instruction that adequately distinguishes the concepts of mental illness and
legal insanity. As demonstrated in DeWit, a verbatim reading of the GBMI
statute and its vaguely defined use of the terms mental illness and insanity
is wholly inadequate.' 27 A new insanity instruction should be adopted which
informs the jury of the probable disposition of the defendant under each
alternative verdict.' 28 One commentator has suggested the separation of the
questions of legal insanity and mental illness through the use of a carefully
drafted instruction.'29 This approach is consistent with the legislative intent
underlying the Illinois GBMI amendments'3 ° because it aids the jury in
separating the important concept of mental illness from legal insanity and
informs the jury of the probable disposition of the defendant under the
125. Accord People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 658, 288 N.W.2d 909, 917 (1980) (implicit
requirement in GBMI verdict that courts make a finding of the defendant's mental illness at
the time of trial to avoid constitutional challenges).
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 96-104 and accompanuing text.
128. In Michigan, the jury is instructed:
(1) If you find the defendant committed the act but was not criminally responsi-
ble at the time, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity. If you make such a
decision, the defendant will be immediately committed to the custody of the Center
for Forensic Psychiatry for a period not to exceed sixty days.
1 MICH. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs 7:8:08 (Supp. 1980).
129. See Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 46, at 488. The author proposes the following
instruction to aid juries in distinguishing between insanity and mental illness:
If you find that the defendant did have a substantial capacity to understand the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to act in accordance with the law you must find
that the defendant was legally sane.
If you find the defendant legally sane and guilty you may then consider the question
of mental illness. If you find that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant
suffered from a substantial disorder of his thoughts or moods that significantly
impaired his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability adequate-
ly to deal with the demands of his day-to-day life, then you may find him guilty
but mentally ill.
A defendant found guilty but mentally ill will be institutionalized and treated
under the Department of Health until the sentence imposed by this court expires.
If the defendant is cured before his sentence expires, he will he transferred to the
Department of Correction for the remainder of his term.
Id.
130. For a discussion of the Illinois legislative intent, see supra notes 13 & 14 and accompa-
nying text.
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respective verdicts.' 3 It is suggested that the following instruction would
clarify these distinctions:
Because the defense of insanity has been raised, you must now
consider the question of whether the defendant is criminally respon-
sible for his conduct. You must carefully consider the four verdicts
that may be returned in the case. The verdicts guilty, guilty but
mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and innocent each
have different standards and each provide for a different disposi-
tion of the defendant.
(1) If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
committed the act or possessed the required intent to commit the
offense [if applicable], you must find the defendant innocent. The
court will then immediately release the defendant from custody.
(2) If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the act and possessed the required intent to commit the
offense [if applicable], you must consider whether, because of a
mental illness, the defendant should not be held criminally respon-
sible for his conduct. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, you must find him
not guilty by reason of insanity. A person is insane and not
criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time of the offense,
a mental illness caused the defendant to lack substantial capacity
to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the law's requirements. Abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal, or otherwise anti-social conduct, is not a men-
tal illness. If you find the defendant not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, he will then be committed to the custody of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health until the court determines the defendant
is no longer dangerous to himself or others.
(3) If, however, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did, at the time of the offense, have substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his
conduct to the law's requirements, you must find that the defen-
dant was legally sane. If you find the defendant legally sane you
may then consider separately the defendant's mental illness. If you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
offense, was legally sane but suffered from a substantial disorder
of thought, mood, or behavior which impaired the defendant's judg-
ment at the time of the offense, you must find the defendant guilty
but mentally ill. A defendant found guilty but mentally ill may
131. Michigan courts are able to rely on the combined model GBMI and insanity instruction
found in 1 MICH. CRMNAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7:8:01 to 7:8:13. Instructions are given before
trial to aid the jury in distinguishing between the concepts of mental illness and legal insanity.
Id. at 7:8:01. In addition, the court fully instructs the jury as to the ultimate disposition of
the defendant under each verdict. Id. at 7:8:08 - 7:8:10.
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be sentenced to prison and will receive mental treatment if necessary.
If the defendant's mental health is restored before his sentence ex-
pires, he will remain in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions for the remainder of his term. Alternatively, the court may
sentence the defendant to probation and require the defendant to
participate in a treatment plan ordered by this court.
(4) If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the conduct, possessed the required intent to commit
the offense [if applicable], and was legally sane, but you have a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was mentally ill at
the time of the conduct, you must find the defendant guilty. The
court will then impose the sentence required by law.
In addition to finding a GBMI defendant mentally ill at the time of the
offense, Illinois courts should require a finding of mental illness at trial,
at sentencing, or both, to avoid possible due process challenges."' This could
be accomplished by requiring the pre-trial report to include a statement of
defendant's present mental condition'33 or by ordering a mental examina-
tion as part of the mandatory pre-sentence report. 1 4 Although the statute
does not explicitly require this finding at the pre-trial or pre-sentence stages,
such a procedure should be adopted to determine the defendant's need for
psychiatric treatment.
Finally, although the GBMI amendments give seemingly broad discretion
to judges and prison officials in determining what, if any, psychiatric treat-
ment a GBMI defendant will receive, " ' Illinois courts should utilize the GBMI
treatment provisions to their fullest extent, and order state officials to com-
ply fully with the statute's requirements.' 36 Indeed, without fulfilling the
legislature's promise of psychiatric treatment,' 3 ' the GBMI defendant receives
little except the additional stigma of being labeled mentally ill. The failure
to give the GBMI defendant adequate psychiatric treatment undermines the
basic purpose for requiring the jury to distinguish between mentally ill and
mentally healthy defendants-to provide rehabilitative psychiatric care for
mentally ill defendants.
CONCLUSION
The GBMI amendments were drafted in response to specific instances of
132. Accord People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 658, 288 N.W.2d 909, 916-17 (1980) (prior
to sentencing, a finding of defendant's present mental health must be made).
133. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-6 (1981) (any defendant asserting the insanity defense
at trial is required to submit to psychiatric examination upon motion by state).
134. See id. § 1005-3-1 to 1005-3-3 (although a psychological examination is one alternative
for the court to utilize under pre-sentence procedures, it is not required to order the exam).
135. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
136. Such measures have been expressly approved under the Michigan statutes. See People
v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
137. The Illinois legislative history emphasizes the importance of adequate psychiatric treat-
ment for GBMI defendants. See supra note 14.
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insane defendants committing serious crimes, after being prematurely released
from mental hospitals. Understandably, these events provoked considerable
public outrage. As a result, the GBMI amendments were enacted in an
attempt to reduce the number of persons who were erroneously found
not guilty by reason of insanity and to ensure adequate psychiatric care for
mentally ill defendants. Although these objectives are commendable, the
legislation instituted to achieve these objectives is poorly conceptualized. First,
the confusing distinction between mental illness and legal insanity may deprive
some legally insane defendants of their right to an insanity verdict. Second,
the GBMI defendant's right to psychiatric treatment is illusory due to the
great degree of discretion afforded judges and prison officials in determin-
ing what, if any, psychiatric treatment a GBMI defendant will receive.
In interpreting and implementing the GBMI amendments, Illinois courts
must attempt to clearly instruct jurors so as to avoid the confusion that
may deprive legally insane defendants of an insanity verdict. Courts should
also utilize the GBMI treatment alternatives to their fullest extent to provide
adequate care for mentally ill defendants. Such interpretation can accomplish
the legislature's objectives and remedy potential constitutional defects presently
existing in the amendments.
The proper disposition of the mentally ill offender is a tremendous
challenge for the Illinois legislature. This challenge, however, has not been
adequately met by the GBMI amendments. The subtle distinctions created
by the amendments do little more than create new legal fictions. Although
this Note suggests possible interpretations for Illinois courts to utilize in an
effort to implement the legislature's objectives, it is imperative that the
legislature re-examine the problems associated with administering the insanity
defense by addressing those problems directly, not by generating additional
confusion in an already perplexing area of criminal practice.' 38
Richard C. Palmer
138. As Justice Cardozo aptly noted, "[ilf insanity is not to be a defense, let us say sofrankly and even brutally, but let us not mock ourselves with a definition that palters with






DEPAUL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Copyright 1983
By DePaul University
PRINTED IN U.S.A.
